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Entrapment: The Myth of the Model
Penal Code in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
On June 6, 1973, Pennsylvania Crimes Code Section 313, on
entrapment, became effective.' Since it is modeled after section 2.13
of the Model Penal Code,2 commentators believed section 313 to
overrule prior Pennsylvania law on entrapment and to represent a
legislative defection from the entrapment test accepted by the major-
ity of American jurisdictions.3 The Pennsylvania Superior Court,
however, is divided. That court currently employs two incompatible
interpretations of section 313: one approach that adheres to pre-
code decisions and another holds that these cases are overruled.
4
The purpose of sections I through III of this comment is to define the
source of this inconsistency and, through the use of accepted rules of
statutory construction, resolve the division.5 Section IV addresses
placement of the burden of proof in an entrapment case. This ques-
tion, much like the test for entrapment, has been the subject of mis-
conceptions and conflicting interpretations.6
A. The Approaches to Entrapment
Jurisdictions that have adopted the entrapment defense are
sharply divided over its application and rationale.7 The majority of
1. Crimes and Offenses Act of December 6, 1972, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Pur-
don 1973).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft, 1962).
3. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 168 n. 16 (1976); Ranney,
The Entrapment Defense - What Hath the Model Penal Code Wrought,? 16 DUQ. L. REv. 157,
158 (1977-78); S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED 146 (1974); Toll, Practi-
tioner's Guide to Defenses Under the New Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 849, 859
(1974).
4. See notes 44-61 and accompanying text infra.
5. Pennsylvania's rules for statutory construction and interpretation have been codified
by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1191 (Purdon Supp.
1979).
6. See notes 112-139 and accompanying text infra.
7. Tennessee has apparently not decided to adopt the defense. See Goins v. State, 192
Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1951); Bryant v. State, 549 S.W.2d 956 (Crim. App. 1977). New York
has only recently statutorily adopted the defense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (Consol. 1977).
See 3 People v. Schacher, 47 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Magis. Ct. 1944), in which the court stated flatly
that "it is well settled that entrapment is not recognized as a defense in New York State." Id
at 372. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has noted that all other American jurisdictions
recognize the defense. State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 240, 265 A.2d 11, 13 (1970). For a
American jurisdictions exempt an entrapped defendant from convic-
tion on the basis of an implied exception to the literal words of the
violated criminal statute:' "Congress could not have intended that
its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into
violations."9 Upon this premise, the defense is established "when
the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition
to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order
that they may prosecute."' The defense is successful, therefore,
only upon a determination that police coercion constituted the sole
cause of the defendant's misconduct." Thus, it must be shown that
the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. "[I]f the
accused asserts that he is a lamb who has been led astray he must be
prepared to face evidence that he is a wolf on the prowl."1 2 Courts
applying this view of the defense must, therefore, address two issues:
(1) whether the conduct of the government agent induced the de-
fendant into committing the crime, and (2) whether the defendant
was himself predisposed to engage in the unlawful conduct.' 3 Since
the determination of the motivations of the defendant requires sub-
jective analysis of his character,' 4 the majority position of entrap-
history of the entrapment defense see De Feo, Entrapment As a Defense to Criminal Responsi-
bility, Its History, Theory and Application, I U. S.F. L. REV. 243 (1967).
8. An example of this reasoning is given by LaFave and Scott:
Thus although the statute broadly stated it to be a crime for anyone to sell liquor to
anyone, the legislator did not really intend the statute to cover a sale which came
about as a result of entrapment by a government agent; so the statute should read
that it is a crime for anyone to sell liquor to anyone, except when entrapped by a
government agent.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 372 (1978). The example is based on the facts of
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
9. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
10. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). For a more recent United States
Supreme Court discussion of this defense, see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
12. Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 653 (1st Cir. 1963). Evidence of the defendant's
character must be admissible evidence, not mere hearsay or suspicion. See United States v.
Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D.C. Neb. 1927). Cf. Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007 (10th
Cir. 1948). But see Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
900 (1956), in which the court held that the government could present information which led
officials to believe that the defendant, an alleged narcotics dealer, was engaged in criminal
activity. Accordingly the government, to rebut the entrapment defense, presented the testi-
mony of a narcotics officer concerning information he received from various informers which
led tbe government to initiate the alleged entrapment. 211 F.2d at 519.
13. In the words of Chief Justice Warren: "On the one hand at trial the accused may
examine the conduct of the government agent; and on the other hand, the accused will be
subject to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition' as
bearing on his claim of innocence." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958).
14. This position is premised on the belief that predisposed defendants are largely profes-
sional criminals. Freeing them in order to discipline the police is thought too great a price to
pay. Moreover, when officers deal with the criminally disposed, they may find it necessary to
employ methods that would be inappropriate if directed at the innocent. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); DeFeo, Entrapment As a Defense to Criminal
Responsibility. Its History, Theory and Application, I U. S.F. L. REV. 243 (1967).
ment is often termed the subjective approach to entrapment. 5
In contrast to the majority position, the minority view on en-
trapment does not consider the defendant's character and predisposi-
tion relevant to a determination of the defense, but instead limits
inquiry to the conduct of the law enforcement officers. ' 6 Courts ap-
plying this approach refuse to convict an entrapped defendant not
because his conduct falls outside the proscription of a statute, but
because methods employed by the government to bring about his
conviction cannot be countenanced by a court of law. 7 Since the
defense is based solely on a desire to deter police misconduct, the
defendant's character and predisposition are not considered.' 8
"[Flor my part," said Justice Frankfurter, a leading proponent of this
position, "I think it is a less [sic] evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."' 9
Whether government has indeed "played an ignoble part" is ob-
jectively determined by evaluating the probable effect the police con-
duct would have had if it had been targeted toward a "normally law
abiding person."20 If the police conduct creates a substantial risk
that the crime would have been committed by a person "other than
[one] ready to commit it," an entrapment has occurred and the in-
quiry of the court is over. 21 As noted, whether it in fact caused the
defendant to commit the crime is irrelevant. The defense is available
"even if his guilt be admitted. ' 22 Because the minority position ana-
lyzes the alleged interaction between police and defendant without
regard to the character or propensities of the defendant, this position
is known as the objective approach to entrapment.23
15. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 166 (1976).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
17. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).)
19. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter quoted Justice Holmes' opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 470 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). In Olmstead, Justice Holmes addressed the use of
evidence in a criminal trial that the government had obtained through a secret wire tap.
20. UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, A PRO-
POSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (Official Draft, 1962). Because the standard by which the
police conduct is judged is a hypothetical law abiding person, this defense has also been called
the "Hypothetical-Person Defense". Park, supra note 3, at 171.
22. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. The reasoning for this position as it appears in the Comment to the Model Penal
Code is as follows:
If the defense is available only to persons who are "innocent" the full deterrent effect
of the defense is undermined. Police conduct toward a particular defendant may be
seriously objectionable even though he entertained a purpose to commit crime prior
to any inducement by officials. Law enforcement officials may feel free to employ
forbidden methods if the "innocent" are freed but the habitual offenders, in whom
the police have the greatest interest, will nevertheless be punished. . . .The very
notion that certain police conduct may be improper in relation to the "innocent" but
acceptable when addressed to the "guilty" seems incompatible with the ideal of
equality before the law .... Further, to permit the use against previously convicted
B. The Pre-Code Pennsylvania Law of Entrapment
The defense of entrapment in Pennsylvania originated in Com-
monwealth v. Wasson, a superior court case decided in April, 1910.24
This decision held that a court should acquit a defendant as a matter
of public policy when he had been persuaded to engage in criminal
conduct "by immoral and illegal detective methods."25 The court
noted, however, that judicial tolerance of particular investigative
methods would depend upon the character of the particular defend-
ant. The court stated: "Again, in considering the question of public
policy the clear distinction founded on principle as well as authority,
is to be observed between measures used to entrap a person into
crime. . . and artifice used to detect persons suspected of being en-
gaged in criminal practices . , "26
Subsequent appellate court decisions followed Wasson by con-
tinuing the distinction between innocent persons being lead by police
into crime, and police detection of those already engaged in criminal
conduct. In Commonwealth v. Kutler, 27 the superior court rejected
the argument that the jury should have been instructed not to con-
persons of police measures not permitted toward the rest of society is to fix a perma-
nent status of criminality against the hopes of enlightened penology.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). This position, however, has
been criticized because the court's focus on police conduct might allow an "innocent" defend-
ant to be convicted: "It is recognized that this objective test . . . may work an injustice in
particular cases. . . . [P]ersons who were not predisposed to commit crime may be convicted
when the police conduct is not so offensive as to violate the statutory standard for entrap-
ment." I U.S. COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 306 (1970).
This criticism, however, is unsound. Defendants whose crime results from an entrapment
stand in the same moral position as those who are not entrapped but persuaded by other
persons to commit their offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). The culpable element of any crime is the intent to commit it and it matters little where
the intent to commit it originated. Most courts, even under the subjective formulation of the
defense, distinguish between the intent to commit the crime, or the blameworthy element of
the criminal activity, and the origin of intent for the purposes of the entrapment defense.
Thus, when the defense of entrapment is asserted, there are no "innocent" defendants, under
either formulation of the defense. Therefore, there can be no injustice, as far as that defendant
is concerned, when his defense fails. See Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 522,
366 A.2d 276 (1976) (Cercone, J., dissenting). See also notes 111-141 and accompanying text
infra.
Commentary overwhelmingly supports the objective formulation of the entrapment de-
fense. See Park, supra note 3, at 167 n.13. For commentary supporting the objective formula-
tion of the entrapment defense, see Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Goldstin, For Harold Lasswell:
Some Reections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84
YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); McLean, Informers andAgent Provocuteurs, 1969 CRIM. L. REV.
527 (1969); Schecter, Police Procedure and the Accusatorial Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 521
(1967); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 265-72 (1967);
Williams, The Defense ofEntrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 399 (1959); 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, supra note 23, at
320. For commentary supporting the subjective analysis of entrapment see DeFeo, supra note
7; Park, supra note 3.
24. 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 38 (1910).
25. Id at 57.
26. Id
27. 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 96 A.2d 160 (1953).
sider the defendant's predisposition to commit the charged offense,
but rather to determine only the acceptability of the methods em-
ployed by the police that resulted in defendant's arrest. 28  In Com-
monwealth v. Werner,29 the superior court noted that the test for
entrapment in Pennsylvania was "whether criminal design was cre-
ated by the conduct of the public officials, or whether the officials
merely created an opportunity which a person already disposed to
commit crime sought to exploit."3
Thus, prior to June 1973, success of the entrapment defense in
Pennsylvania depended upon a finding that the defendant was not
predisposed to commit crime.3 Pre-code Pennsylvania law is more
thoroughly explained below.32
C. The Model Penal Code and the Origin of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code
Contrary to the subjective approach to entrapment that was
adopted by the judiciary in Pennsylvania, the American Law Insti-
tute endorsed an objective formulation of the defense.33 The draft-
ers of the Model Penal Code originally offered both subjective and
objective positions in the Tentative Drafts, and attached to these for-
mulations comments explaining the history and reasoning underly-
ing both approaches. The Institute, however, finally endorsed the
objective approach34 and published only that formulation in the
28. Id at 157, 96 A.2d at 162.
29. 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 509, 149 A.2d 509 (1959).
30. Id at 512, 144 A.2d at 511.
31. See Commonwealth v. Klein, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 294 A.2d 815 (1972).
32. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra.
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Final Draft, 1962).
34. The formulations of both approaches to the entrapment defense appear in MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) as follows:
Section 2.10 Entrapment (1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in
cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence of the commission of an offense he solicits, encourages, or otherwise
induces another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense when he is not
then otherwise disposed to do so.
Alternative formulation of Subsection (1)
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an
official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, he solicits or encourages another person to engage in con-
duct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion in inducement which creates a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready
to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this section, a person prosecuted for an
offense shall be acquitted if he proves that his conduct occurred in response to an
entrapment [the issue of entrapment Shall be tried by the court in the absence of the
jury].
(3) The defense afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for a crime
involving conduct causing or threatening bodily injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
1962 Final Draft of the Model Penal Code."
Within a year of the release of the Model Penal Code, the presi-
dent of the Pennsylvania Bar Association appointed a special com-
mittee to consider it as substance for a new state crimes code.36
Encouraged by the results of the committee, the Joint State Govern-
ment Commission began drafting a new Pennsylvania Penal Code
based on the American Law Institute's recommendations.37 The ef-
forts of this commission resulted in passage of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code in late 1972.38
D. Section 313 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code
Section 313 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states in full:
§ 313. Entrapment.
(a) General Rule. - A public law enforcement official or a
person acting in cooperation with such an official perpe-
trates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence of the commission of an offense, he induces or
encourages another person to'engage in conduct consti-
tuting such offense by either:
(1) making knowingly false representations designed
to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohib-
ited; or
(2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that such an offense
will be committed by persons other than those who
are ready to commit it.
(b) Burden of proof. - Except as provided in subsection (c)
of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall
be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evi-
dence that his conduct occurred in response to an en-
trapment.
(c) Exception. - The defense afforded by this section is un-
available when causing or threatening bodily injury is an
element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a
person other than the person perpetrating the entrap-
ment.
39
Except for a provision in the Model Penal Code requiring the
court to try an issue of entrapment to the court in the absence of the
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Final Draft, 1962).
36. S. TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED, Foreward (1974).
37. JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM., PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA at vii
(1967). The Joint State Government Commission is a continuing agency composed of mem-
bers from both houses of the General Assembly and created for the development of facts and
recommendations on all phases of government for the use of the General Assembly. See Act
of 1937, July 1, P.L. 246, as last amended December 8, 1959, P.L. 1740.
38. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code is codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-7505
(Purdon 1973). For the legislative history of the Crimes Code see COMBINED HISTORY OF
SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS SESSION OF 1972, 1633-1637, 1696-1698, 2022, 4080-4087 (1972).
39. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon 1973).
jury,4° section 313 is identical to section 2.13 of the Model Penal
Code.4' Given the American Law Institute's intended interpretation
of section 2.13,42 it is not surprising that commentators believed the
Pennsylvania Legislature had overruled its prior judicial approach to
entrapment and had statutorily adopted the Model Penal Code ob-
jective approach to the entrapment defense.43 Entrapment decisions
issued by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, have been
sharply divided; the court has applied both the subjective and objec-
tive approaches to entrapment, apparently without recognizing the
obvious conflict.
II. The Post-Code Cases
The first Pennsylvania appellate court decision interpreting sec-
tion 313 is Commonwealth v. Mot. 44 In that case, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court began its analysis by quoting subsections 313(a) and
(b) in full.45 It then stated:
Our court has discussed entrapment in a number of cases and has
stated with respect to such defense that '[tihe test, therefore, is
whether criminal design was created by the conduct of the public
officials, or whether the officials merely created an opportunity
which a person already disposed to commit crime sought to ex-
ploit.' The prerequisite to allowing an entrapment defense are
dual: a defendant not disposed to commit the crime and police
conduct which may ensnare the innocent victim.46
This statement illustrates two obvious yet surprising aspects of
the Mott decision. First, the court applied a subjective test for en-
trapment, which appears to conflict with the newly adopted, ostensi-
bly objective approach of section 313; second, the court drew its
requirements for the defense from pre-code cases, apparently inter-
preting section 313 as a codification of that prior law.
Unfortunately, the Mot decision does not reveal the basis for
this interpretation of section 313. The court seemed merely to as-
40. Pennsylvania has traditionally submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury. See
Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Kutler, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 153, 96 A.2d 160 (1953). A provision of the Model Penal Code,
which would have required that "[t]he issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the
absence of the jury", was not adopted by the legislature. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Final
Draft, 1962).
41. The Model Penal Code does not, however, provide the titles "General rule," "Burden
of Proof," and "Exceptions." Additionally, subsections are identified by numbers instead of
letters. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 313 (1973) and MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Final Draft,
1962). In all other aspects the sections are identical.
42. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
44. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 334 A.2d 771 (1975).
45. Id at 54, 334 A.2d at 773.
46. Id at 55, 334 A.2d at 773 (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Klein, 222
Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 294 A.2d 815 (1972); Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 173
A.2d 176 (1961); Commonwealth v. Werner, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 509, 512, 149 A.2d 509, 511
(1959). See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra and notes 77-81 infra.
sume its result. Indeed, the Mot case is the first Pennsylvania deci-
sion to display "a remarkable tendency to construe statutes based
upon the Model Penal Code as codifications of the subjective ap-
proach."47
In Commonwealth v. Proietto, 48 the Mort decision was followed
in both result and approach. In Proietto, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on en-
trapment unless evidence is adduced that he was not disposed to
commit the alleged crime, and that the police conduct was likely to
entrap.49 As in Mot, the court offered no explanation for this inter-
pretation.
Although the superior court, in Mot and Proietto, interprets
section 313 as a codification of the subjective approach to entrap-
ment, later superior court cases strayed from that interpretation. In
Commonwealth v. Jones,50 the superior court stated:
The present codification of entrapment finds its origin in Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman .... This test
shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particu-
lar defendants to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, ob-
jectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and
47. Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 168 n.16 (1976). Park
suggests that "[plerhaps the derivation of the statute was not called to the court's attention."
Id
The Mot court's formulation of the entrapment defense appears to be an exercise in judi-
cial legislation. Section 313 is apparently a codification of the objective view of entrapment,
yet the court requires an absence of predisposition to commit the offense before it will make
the defense available. A Pennsylvania court does not have the power to construe a statute
without a showing of ambiguity. See Commonwealth v. Aljiu Dumas Private Detective
Agency Inc., 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 369 A.2d 850 (1977).
Within a month of the Mott decision the superior court implicitly recognized a change in
the entrapment law in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 370,
343 A.2d 355 (1975), the court observed in a footnote that a different test for entrapment was
applied to that case then would be applied under the existing law, since the alleged offense was
committed prior to the effective date of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. This decision was the
first in a line of cases applying pre-code law yet recognizing that that law no longer applied to
offenses committed after June 6, 1973. See also Commonwealth v. Herron, 475 Pa. 461, 380
A.2d 1228 (1977); Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 522, 366 A.2d 276 (1976).
These cases are often cited by courts that recognize no change in the entrapment law.
In Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 343 A.2d 355 (1975), Judge Hoff-
man, in support of reversal, suggested that the present law of entrapment is a balancing test,
i.e., "the greater the police misconduct, the less need for lack of predisposition." Id at 379,
343 A.2d at 360. Judge Hoffman's statement lacks support or further discussion, but this test
has been adopted by New Mexico. State v. Sainz, 84 N.M. 259, 501 P.2d 1247 (1972). In that
case the court stated: "We agree with defendant's statement that '... as the part played by the
state increases, the importance of the defendant's predisposition and intent decreases, until at
some point entrapment as a matter of law is reached...'" Id at 261, 501 P.2d at 1249. This
approach is a compromise between the objective and subjective views of the defense. Under
this test, if misconduct by government agents is too great, then the predisposition of the de-
fendant becomes irrelevant. A subjective evaluation of the defendant's predisposition occurs
only if police misconduct, as measured on an objective continuum, does not surpass a certain
level of seriousness.
48. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 385, 361 A.2d 712 (1976).
49. Id at 389, 361 A.2d at 714.
50. 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976).
willing to commit crime.5'
Clearly, the court applied the objective test for entrapment de-
spite the result in Proietto three months earlier. The basis for the
court's reasoning was apparently the fact that section 313 is identical
to the formulation of the entrapment defense in the Model Penal
Code.52 Neither the history of the statute nor the section itself, how-
ever, is examined in the opinion. Instead the court merely assumes,
perhaps reasonably, that section 313 was intended by the Penn-
sylvania General Assembly to be the same approach to the defense
that was approved by Justice Frankfurter 3 and later codified in the
Model Penal Code. Remarkably, the court fails even to suggest that
any other interpretation of section 313 has ever been asserted in the
Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the Jones decision led one commen-
tator to remark that "courts now realize that the code provision
adopted the 'objective test' of the Model Penal Code."54 This obser-
vation was premature.
In Commonwealth v. Clawson,55 decided eleven months after
Jones, the superior court again changed its interpretation of section
313(1): "This rule requires before the defense becomes available, (1)
the defendant not disposed to commit the crime and (2) police con-
duct likely to entrap the innocently disposed."56 This subjective ap-
proach plainly opposes the objective reasoning of Jones and
apparently returns to the position taken in Mott and Proietto. The
Clawson court, however, neither recognizes this glaring shift in ap-
proach nor provides the statutory language from which it derived its
test. Moreover, the court, in a footnote, admits that section 313
originated in the Model Penal Code, but gives no reason for contra-
dicting the Code by adopting a subjective approach.57 As in Jones,
the court does not admit that section 313 has ever been construed in
a contrary manner.
Three months later, the superior court reversed its interpretation
of section 313 for the third time. Citing Clawson, but following
Jones, the court, in Commonwealth v. Manley,58 applied the objec-
tive approach:
When considering a defense of entrapment, rather than focus on a
particular defendant's readiness to commit the crime, we look at
the police conduct to determine whether there is a substantial risk
51. Id at 310-11, 363 A.2d at 1285.
52. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
53. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
54. Ranney, The Entrapment Defense - What Hath the ModelPenal Code Wrought,? 16
DUQ. L. REV. 157, 159 n.12 (1977-78).
55. 250 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 378 A.2d 1008 (1977).
56. Id at 425, 378 A.2d at 110, quoting Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. Ct.
97, 104, 173 A.2d 776, 780 (1961).
57. Id at 425 n.3, 378 A.2d at 110 n.3.
58. 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 77, 380 A.2d 1290 (1977).
that the offense would be committed by one innocently disposed.59
Thus by December 1977, two clearly defined yet contradictory
interpretations of entrapment law existed in Pennsylvania. Mott,
Proieto, and Clawson applied the subjective test for entrapment;
Jones and Manley applied the objective standard. Later cases exac-
erbate this division of authority.6" Since the superior court has
promulgated two incompatible interpretations of section 313, the




The object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effec-
tuate the intention of the legislature.62 If a statute is clear, the plain
meaning should not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
some unstated legislative intent.63 A careful analysis of section 313,
therefore, must first address the question of whether the statute is
clear on its face. An affirmative answer would terminate the in-
quiry.' Given the manifest inconsistency of judicial application of
the entrapment defense, however, it is apparent that the language of
section 313 is ambiguous. Therefore, inquiry into statutory meaning
must turn to the former law of entrapment 65 and the legislative his-
59. Id at 87, 380 A.2d at 1294.
60. In Commonwealth v. Lee, 262 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 396 A.2d 724 (1978), the court
discussed the defense of entrapment: "The defense is available, however, and a jury charge is
necessary only if there is evidence that the police conduct was likely to entrap the innocently
disposed." Id at 221, 396 A.2d at 725. In Commonwealth v. Stokes, 264 Pa. Super. Ct. 515,
400 A.2d 204 (1979), the court held that "there is no entrapment where, as here, the police
conduct viewed objectively, did no more than afford appellant an opportunity to commit
crime." Id at 518, 400 A.2d at 206.
Noticeably absent from this doctrinal paper war are Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sions. The issue of the proper approach to be taken in applying the entrapment defense was
only before that court once during this era of confusion. Commonwealth v. Herron, 475 Pa.
461, 380 A.2d 1228 (1977). Since the alleged offense occurred prior to the effective date of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the Herron court applied pre-code entrapment law. Nevertheless,
the court's reasoning is still noteworthy. The text of the opinion gives no clue that the present
law of entrapment is other than that which the court applies. Only in a footnote does the court
imply that present law may be altered by section 313 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. The
approach taken by the supreme court leaves the distinct impression that the high court is either
unaware of the present confusion in entrapment law, or is intentionally avoiding the issue.
61. Predictably, lower Pennsylvania courts have also been applying divergent standards,
although the subjective approach to entrapment seems the more popular. For cases applying a
subjective analysis, see Commonwealth v. Vermeulen, 29 Bucks 252 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Ogden, 77 Lack. 85 (1975); Commonwealth v. Brumbach, 97 Dauph. 7 (1974). For a case
applying the objective approach, see Commonwealth v. Hicks, 7 D. & C.3d 136 (1978).
In Commonwealth v. Vermeulen, 29 Bucks 252 (1976), the court, although it did not men-
tion the split of authority over the defense of entrapment, noted that it was applying the "true"
test for the defense. Id at 256.
62. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
63. Id § 1921(b). See also Schneck v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 96, 383
A.2d 227 (1978).
64. See City of Pittsburgh v. Roysten Serv., Inc., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 394, 390 A.2d 896
(1978).
65. 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
tory of section 313.66
4. The Ambiguify of Section 313
To determine whether section 313 is ambiguous, two subsec-
tions of section 313 must be analyzed: subsection 313(a) (General
Rule) and subsection 313(b) (Burden of Proof).6 7 Section 313(a) de-
fines entrapment. An entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
official or his agent "induces or encourages"6 another person to
commit a crime by employing methods of persuasion or inducement
that "create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it."69 This
subsection clearly indicates that an objective test is to be applied to
determine the success of the defense. It refers to the risk that police
conduct will seduce an innocent person into crime, rather than
whether an innocent person was in fact seduced.70 Additionally, the
words "such an offense will be committed" refer to future occur-
rences and to similar crimes, not-to the actual offense. Thus, section
313 does not require that police actually lead the defendant into
crime. It is sufficient that the police conduct merely "induces or en-
courages" him to commit the offense.
Subsection 313(b) purports to address burden of proof, but it
goes further and establishes requirements for acquittal. Section
313(b) states that "a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquit-
ted If he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct
occurred in response to an entrapment."'" The language of this sub-
section clearly indicates that merely because the police have engaged
in conduct likely to entrap, the defendant does not merit acquittal.
The defendant must also prove that his conduct was in response to
that entrapment. Therefore, for a defendant to be acquitted under
section 313, the police must have engaged in conduct likely to entrap
and the defendant's criminal act must have been in response to that
entrapment.
The legislature did not make clear the interpretation it intended
courts to draw from the specific language "in response to"an entrap-
66. Id § 1921(c)(7) (provides that "[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit, the
intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering (5) the former law, if
any, .. [or] (8) the contemporaneous legislative history."
67. See text accompanying note 39 supra for full text of section 313. Subsection 313(c)
provides only that the defense of entrapment is not available to defendants who are charged
with crimes of violence. It therefore has no bearing on whether section 313 is an objective or
subjective formulation of the defense.
68. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon 1973).
69. Id § 313(a).
70. See Park, supra note 3, at 168 n. 16. Park analyzes this language of the Model Penal
Code.
71. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(b) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 39
supra for full text of section 313(b).
ment. Perhaps the legislature merely intended this language to indi-
cate that the defendant has the burden of proving that he was the
target of police coercion prior to his commission of the crime. Yet,
subsection 313(a) already mandates that the police conduct must
have induced or encouraged the defendant. Therefore, if the legisla-
ture only intended that defendant prove that he was the target of
police coercion, this intention could have been served if subsection
313(b) required defendant to prove only that he was entrapped. The
words "in response to" are redundant.
The legislature must have intended that this language be given a
different meaning.72 Requiring the defendant to prove that he was
acting in response to entrapping police conduct also requires proof
that he was not acting in response to any other element, such as the
opportunity to commit the crime, which was present at the time he
was subject to police coercion. The legislature intended to require
more than a mere showing that the defendant was "encouraged or
induced" to engage in crime. He must also show that he was not
"stand[ing] ready to break the law when the occasion [arose]. . .. "I'
This inquiry requires subjective determination of defendant's moti-
vations.
Thus, section 313 is susceptible of interpretation as either a sub-
jective or an objective approach to entrapment. Subsection 313(a)
requires an objective determination of the risk of entrapment, while
subsection 313(b) requires a subjective analysis to determine whether
the defendant acted in response to an actual entrapment. Moreover,
the superior court's divergent interpretations present substantial
practical evidence that the statute is ambiguous. Consequently, to
determine the intended construction of section 313, settled rules of
statutory interpretation require consideration of pre-code74 law as
well as the legislative history underlying the statute.75
B. Pre- Code Formulation of the Entrapment Defense
Commonwealth v. Conway76 is the leading case defining pre-
code entrapment law. In that case,\the Pennsylvania Superior Court
addressed whether the defense of entrapment should be submitted to
the jury when the defendant has never been convicted of the type of
72. In construing the language of a statute, a court must assume that the legislature in-
tended that every word of the statute would have effect. The court, therefore, cannot assume
that the legislature is using repetitive or superfluous language. See Commonwealth v. Dris-
coil, 485 Pa. 99, 401 A.2d 312 (1979). See also Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa. 37, 391 A.2d
1303 (1978), in which the court stated that language in a statute must be interpreted in a
manner designed to give effect to each and every provision. Id at 42 n.6, 391 A.2d at 1306 n.6.
73. Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 102, 173 A.2d 776, 779 (1961).
74. 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
75. Id § 1921(c)(7).
76. 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961).
offense charged, yet evidence of police coercion is minimal." The
court began its discussion of this issue by examining both the minor-
ity and majority approaches to the defense and expressing its dissat-
isfaction with both formulations, particularly as codified in the
Tentative Draft of the Model Penal Code.7 8 The Code's subjective
formulation emphasizes the innocence of defendant's character, but
also requires some conduct by law enforcement officials that merits
disapproval. It provides no standard, however, by which the accept-
ability of police conduct is to be judged. The objective formulation
provides this missing guidance, but it is also available to predisposed
defendants and is therefore inconsistent with Pennsylvania law.7 9
Consequently, to arrive at a clear formulation of Pennsylvania law
the court drew from both entrapment formulations what it consid-
ered to be their better elements: a clear standard of measure to de-
termine the acceptability of police conduct, and the requirement of
actual causation. The superior court stated:
The defense of entrapment in Pennsylvania, as derived from our
own cases in the light of the other authorities mentioned, arises
only when a law enforcement officer, by employing methods of
persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that per-
sons not otherwise ready to commit the criminal act will do so,
actually induces such a person to commit the act.80
This unusual statement of a subjective approach to entrap-
ment8 l is very similar to the subjective interpretation of section 313.
Both formulations require police conduct likely to entrap the inno-
cently disposed. The formulations differ slightly, however, in their
description of the "subjective" inquiry. Conway requires actual in-
ducement and section 313 requires actual response. Nevertheless, be-
cause the difference between the two formulations turns only on the
interpretation of these two words, the Conway statement of the de-
77. Id at 101, 173 A.2d at 777. The court resolved this issue by holding that if no evi-
dence of defendant's predisposition to commit the crime exists and there is some evidence of
police coercion, the defense should be submitted to the jury, but with "proper caution as to its
limits." Id at 104, 173 A.2d at 780. See note 80 and accompanying text infra for the court's
formulation of the defense's limitations.
78. Id at 103, 173 A.2d at 779. Both formulations of the defense appear at note 34 supra.
79. Id The court's opinion reflects criticisms that appear in a law review note cited by
the court. See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1959-60).
80. 196 Pa. Super. Ct. at 103-04, 173 A.2d at 779.
81. Compare the language of the Conway formulation of the entrapment defense to the
wording of Illinois' codified subjective approach to entrapment. In Illinois, an entrapment
occurs "if [the defendant]s conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee or
agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such person." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Indiana's codification of the entrapment de-
fense states that "[i]t is a defense that the prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a
law-enforcement officer... using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to
engage in the conduct .. " IND. CODE § 35-41-3-9 (1976). Note that neither of these formu-
lations of the subjective approach to entrapment requires an objective evaluation of police
conduct, as in the Conway formulation. For other codifications of the subjective approach to
the defense see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-15 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 432 (1974); FLA.
STAT. § 812.028 (1981 Supp.); GA. CODE § 26-905 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.275 (1977).
fense lends substantial credibility to the proposition that the legisla-
ture intended section 313 to be merely a codification of prior
Pennsylvania law.
C Legislative History
Because section 313 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code is identi-
cal to section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code, substantial support ex-
ists for the view that the General Assembly intended section 313 to
be a codification of the Model Penal Code's objective approach to
entrapment.8 2 Comprehensive analysis, however, must address leg-
islative history as well.
8 3
The legislative record of the Crimes Code 84 offers the least
assistance in discerning the legislative purpose of specific sections of
the code. The debates concerning passage of the Crimes Code cover
less than fourteen pages of the Senate and House Journals com-
bined.s5 At no time did either house specifically debate section 313.
The official comments of the Joint State Government Commis-
sion, on the other hand, offer some evidence of legislative intent.86
The Commission intended these comments to set forth the purpose
of code provisions and to guard against misconstruction. 7 Because
other evidence of legislative intent is lacking, these comments are
given great weight in ascertaining the legislative purpose of section
313.88
The Commission comment concerning section 313 states in full:
This section is derived from Section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code
and is generally in accord with existing law. Existing law of en-
trapment is set forth in Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa. Supe-
rior Ct. 97 (1961), where the court briefly discussed the Model
Penal Code provision and concluded at page 103: "The defense of
entrapment in Pennsylvania, as derived from our cases in the light
of the other authorities just mentioned, arises only when a law
enforcement officer, by employing methods of persuasion or in-
ducement which create a substantial risk that persons not other-
wise ready to commit the criminal act will do so, actually induces
such a person to commit the act." The court went on to say that
82. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
83. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(7) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
84. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code was introduced into the general assembly as Senate
Bill No. 455.
85. See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE, Session of
1972 at 1633-1637, 1696-1698, 2022. See also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Legislative
Journal-House, Session of 1972 at 4080-4087. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code was introduced
into the General Assembly on March 30, 1971 and received its final ratifying vote in the House
of Representatives on November 21, 1972. The Senate concurred on November 30, 1972.
86. JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM'N PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 213,
Comment at 51 (1967).
87. S. TOLL, supra note 3, at vi.
88. See Commonwealth Dep't. of Transp. v. Gehvis, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 339 A.2d
639 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 471 Pa. 210, 369 A.2d 1271 (1977).
the defense is available where there is a defendant not disposed to
commit the crime and "police conduct likely to entrap the inno-
cently disposed." Under Pennsylvania law, the defense is submit-
ted to the jury when the foregoing elements are present.8 9
Surprisingly, the comment indicates that the Commission inter-
preted section 313 to be a formulation of the majority, subjective
approach to the entrapment defense. Furthermore, the Commission
apparently intended this section merely to codify the existing law of
entrapment and to require the same criteria for the defense that was
required in Conway. 9 0 Consequently, either the Commission errone-
ously interpreted section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code, perhaps be-
ing deceived by the similarity between the formulation of the
Conway court and the formulation of the American Law Institute;9t
or they correctly perceived section 2.13 to be capable of an interpre-
tation generally in accordance with the Conway formulation of the
defense.
Competing factors must be weighed in determining the effect of
this comment on a final interpretation of section 313. The text of a
statute controls in the event of conflict between the text and a com-
mission's comments. 92 The comments of the Joint State Govern-
ment Commission, however, are assumed to be the result of the
study and recommendations of an able commission appointed by the
Governor of the Commonwealth.93 The comments should not,
therefore, lightly be declared erroneous. Additionally, the comment
adds to the already substantial evidence that section 313 is ambigu-
ous and casts substantial doubt upon the proposition that the legisla-
ture intended that section to overrule prior entrapment law.
D. The Requirement of Clear Legislative Intent
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
Legislative intent to effect any departure from a firmly established
policy of law must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language
and well-settled and established principles of law are not to be
regarded as changed unless the terms of new legislation unmistak-
89. JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM'N PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 213,
Comment at 51 (1967).
90. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text supra
91. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra
92. 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1939 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
93. In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934). In that case the court stated:
The report of a commission appointed to codify the law upon a given subject is enti-
tled to even greater weight than the report of a committee; especially is this so where
the legislature enacts the exact language of the commission's draft .... It is impossi-
ble to conclude that the legislature in approving the language of the section as the
commission had drafted it did not do so with the intent that it should have the effect
which the commission designed and pointed out to the law makers.
Id at 326, 172 A.2d at 140-41. Section 313 is identical to section 213 of the Joint State Gov-
ernment Committee draft.
ably and unambiguously indicate such a change.94
Section 313, interpreted as an objective formulation of the de-
fense of entrapment, clearly cannot meet this standard. The deci-
sions of Mot through Manley present substantial practical evidence
that the statute is not clear on its face. Moreover, statutory analysis
clearly illustrates an alternative interpretation of section 313, which
requires a test for the defense that is identical to pre-code entrap-
ment law. Finally, in light of the comment of the Joint State Gov-
ernment Commission, no court could conclude with certainty that
the legislative history of section 313 requires an interpretation of that
section in concert with the objective approach to entrapment in the
Model Penal Code. The pre-code law of entrapment is not unmis-
takably and unambiguously overruled. The current test for entrap-
ment is identical to the test of Commonwealth v. Conway" the police
must engage in conduct likely to entrap the innocently disposed and
the police conduct must actually induce the defendant to commit the
crime.
E Recommendations
Pennsylvania is not alone in its difficulty. The Superior Court
of Utah has also interpreted a statute patterned after the Model Pe-
nal Code to require an innocently disposed defendant.95 Only the
dissent in State v. Curtis found the derivation of the statute determi-
native.96 New York has had a similar experience.97 The supreme
94. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Comm'n, 393 Pa. 639, 647,
145 A.2d 172, 175 (1958).
95. State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1973). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
interpreted UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975) as a codification of prior state subjec-
tive entrapment law, despite the fact that the statute was clearly based on the Model Penal
Code objective formulation of the defense. An entrapment occurred under the Utah statute
when a law enforcement officer induced the commission of the offense by methods "creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it."
Id The word "risk" in this formulation clearly refers to the possibility of leading a person
into crime, not whether in fact the police conduct corrupted an innocent person.
96. 542 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah 1973).
97. See People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1972).
The statute construed in this case, however, is a model of ambiguity. It states:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by
a public servant ... and when methods used ... were such as to create a substantial
risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to com-
mit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active inducement
or encouragement.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.04 (Consol. 1977). At first glance, the statute seems to be a formulation
of the objective approach to entrapment. The requirement that the methods used "create a
substantial risk that the offense will be committed" address future conduct and are clearly an
objective formulation of the defense. Yet the statute also contains language that can be inter-
preted as requiring a subjective inquiry. The requirement that defendant engaged in the crimi-
nal conduct "because" he was induced clearly implies actual causation, i.e., that the defendant
would not have committed the crime except for the police inducement. This, of course, would
require a showing that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. See State v.
courts of North Dakota98 and New Hampshire,99 however, have en-
countered little difficulty in finding that statutes containing similar
language are codifications of the objective approach to entrapment.
Although the various statutes often are derived from different
proposed codifications of the defense, their slightly different lan-
guage cannot explain the different results."l ° Instead, the apparent
lack of willingness by the courts to make the defense available to
"guilty" defendants absent a clear and unavoidable legislative man-
date dictates the conflicting interpretations. The decisions by the
Pennsylvania, Iowa, and New York courts indicate that none of the
proposed statutes can supply the needed clarity.
The problem can be resolved in two ways. The first alternative,
chosen by the state of Hawaii, is the adoption of a comment clearly
explaining the legislative purpose.' 0 ' The Hawaii Legislature has
insured the adoption of the objective formulation of the Model Penal
Code on the entrapment defense by using this approach.
0 2
The second alternative is to adopt a clear and unambiguous
statutory text. The Pennsylvania experience with the Model Penal
Code clearly illustrates that many current formulations of the objec-
tive approach to entrapment contain language that can be inter-
preted as requiring that the defendant not be predisposed to commit
the crime.'0 3 Clear language mandating that the defense is available
to the defendant despite his predisposition is necessary. The follow-
ing model is suggested:
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing
Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 319 A.2d 636 (1974) (similar statute interpreted as an objective formula-
tion of the defense).
98. State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978) (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-
11 (1976)).
99. State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 319 A.2d 636 (1974) (construing 5 N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626.5 (Supp. 1973)). This statute is almost identical to N.Y. PENAL LAW §4005 (Con-
sol. 1977), which has been interpreted as an objective formulation of the defense. See note 96
supra.
100. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975), which has been interpreted as a formula-
tion of the subjective approach, is based on the Model Penal Code. It requires police conduct
"creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it" before an entrapment is found. Id See note 94 supra. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
05-11 (1976) is based on the Proposed Federal Crimes Code, U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702 (1971), and
requires police conduct "likely to cause normally law abiding persons to commit the offense."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1976). It has been interpreted as an objective formulation of
the defense. See note 97 supra, The wording of both statutes is clearly a formulation of the
objective approach to entrapment. Both address the rsk that is created by the police coercion,
not whether the police actually caused the defendant to commit the crime.
101. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-237 (Special Pamphlet) is identical to the Model Penal
Code's formulation of the defense. Although the commentary accompanying the section is not
actual evidence of legislative intent, it may be used as an aid in understanding the provisions
of the code. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-105 (1976); State v. Nobriga, 56 Hawaii 75, 77, 527 P.2d
1269, 1271 (1974).
102. See State v. Anderson, 58 Hawaii 479, 572 P.2d 159 (1977).
103. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text supra.
the offense. An entrapment occurs when a law enforcement offi-
cial or a person acting in cooperation with such an official em-
ploys methods of persuasion or inducement that create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons
not otherwise ready to commit it. The predisposition of defendant
to engage in the alleged illegal activity is irrelevant to the determi-
nation of whether the defendant has been entrapped into commit-
ting the offense.
The language defining when an entrapment occurs is based on
Model Penal Code Section 2.13 and clearly indicates that the issue of
entrapment is to be deduced by objective inquiry.""° The first and
the last lines of the proposed section further guard against miscon-
struction."o
IV. Burden of Proof
Section 313(b) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states that "a
person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a
preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to
an entrapment."'" Contrary to the statute, in Commonwealth v.
Cameron ' 07 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania placed the burden
on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant's alleged criminal conduct did not result from an entrap-
ment. 108 In Commonwealth v. Jones, "o however, the superior court
upheld the provisions of section 313(b) and required the defendant
to prove an entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 Ini-
tially, this discrepancy between Jones and Cameron appears to turn
on the different approaches to the defense applied by the respective
courts. Cameron applied a subjective test to entrapment and Jones
applied an objective test. Close analysis, however, discloses that the
distinction between the two decisions turns instead on misplaced re-
liance by the Cameron court upon the earlier superior court decision
of Commonwealth v. Loccisano, "' a case decided on facts that oc-
curred prior to the effective date of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code.
A. Commonwealth v. Loccisano
In Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 11 the superior court addressed
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth
104. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
105. This language is derived from UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975).
106. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon 1973). See text accompanying note 39
supra.
107. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 372 A.2d 904 (1977).
108. Id at 441, 372 A.2d at 907.
109. 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976). See notes 50-54 supra for a discussion
of this case.
110. Id at 314, 363 A.2d at 1287.
111. 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 522, 366 A.2d 276 (1976).
112. Id
v. Rose 113 required a shift of the burden of proving an entrapment
from the defendant to the Commonwealth." 4 In Rose, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that in any criminal prosecution, "the
Commonwealth has the unshifting burden to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt all elements of the crime."'" 5 The question confronting
the Loccisano court was whether the defense of entrapment negates
an element of the offense, specifically, whether it negates the element
of intent." 6 The court stated:
The appellant's defense is that he had no intention of engaging in
illegal activity until he was persuaded to do so by the officer's
agent. The element in dispute is criminal intent. It is the Common-
wealth's burden to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
this element, just as it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove
every element of the crime. It defies logic to require the Common-
wealth to prove the presence of an element and at the same time
demand that the defendant prove its absence.'
Thus, the Loccisano court held that the proof of an entrapment
negates the element of intent necessary to the commission of a
crime."I8 Therefore, the Commonwealth, under the Rose decision,
has the burden of proving the absence of an entrapment beyond a
reasonable doubt.' The dissent points out, however, that the ma-
jority's reasoning is "simply incorrect." 20 By its statement that "the
element in dispute is criminal intent," the majority in Loccisano has
mistakenly combined two distinct inquiries: (1) whether the defend-
ant possessed the proper mens rea,' 2 ' and (2) whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime.' 22 Closer analysis reveals the
distinction between the two issues.
Under the first inquiry, proving mens rea as an element of the
offense, the prosecution need only show that defendant intended to
commit the offense, 123 that is, that his conduct was purposeful. 24
This type of "intent" makes no distinction between intent that
113. 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
114. 243 Pa. Super. Ct. at 535, 366 A.2d at 283.
115. 457 Pa. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
116. 243 Pa. Super. Ct. at 535, 366 A.2d at 283.
117. Id at 537, 366 A.2d at 283 (emphasis added).
118. Id at 537, 366 A.2d at 284.
119. Id
120. Id at 538, 366 A.2d at 284.
121. Mens rea is often defined synonymously with criminal intent and is the mental state
of mind that is a prerequisite to a finding of guilt for all crimes except strict liability offenses.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 201 (1972).
122. This inquiry addresses the question whether the police officer "implanted in the mind
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the offense and induce its commission in order
that the officer might prosecute him." People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 26, 147 N.E.2d 284, 287
(1958).
123. See Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1938-29).
124. The Model Penal Code distinguishes between a purposeful action and a knowing
action.
In defining culpability a narrow distinction is drawn between acting purposely
and knowingly. . . .Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a
common element in both conceptions. But action is not purposive with respect to the
originates in the mind of the defendant and intent that is implanted
in his mind by an outside agent. If the defendant either desires the
result of his criminal activity or knows that result is almost certain to
occur, the intent element of the crime is satisfied and the necessary
mens rea is established.'
25
In contrast to the mens rea inquiry, the "origin of intent" in-
quiry for purposes of determining the predisposition of a defendant
does not concern itself with intent as an element of the offense.'
26
When entrapment is the sole defense, the defendant concedes that he
intended to commit his criminal act. 127  Instead, the "origin of in-
tent" inquiry addresses the issue of where the idea and motivation to
commit the crime was conceived.' 2 1 If a law enforcement officer
conceives of a crime, and then persuades an otherwise innocent per-
son to engage in it, an entrapment has occurred and a defense is
available. This defense, however, has nothing to do with the inno-
cence of the defendant.129 If parties with no connection to the gov-
ernment persuaded defendant to commit the alleged crime, that
coercion would offer a defendant no defense.
130
Thus, the purpose of this defense is solely to deter police mis-
conduct. 3 For that reason, the defense has been likened to the ex-
nature or the result of the actor's conduct unless it was his conscious object to per-
form an action of that nature or to cause such a result. The distinction is no doubt
inconsequential for most purposes of liability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1953).
125. The following definition of intent has been propounded by two commentators:
It is now generally accepted that a person who acts (or omits to act) intends a result of
his act (or omission) under two quite different circumstances; (1) when he consciously
desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct;
and (2) when he knows that that result is practically certain to follow from his con-
duct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 120, at 196.
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The Comment also
states:
The defense does not assert that the defendant has not engaged in criminal activity
nor does it truly seek to excuse or justify a criminal act. The defense is, in fact, a
complaint by the accused against the state for employing a certain kind of unsavory
enforcement. The accused is asking to be relieved of the consequences of his guilt by
objecting to police tactics. He is a plaintiff and should be required to come forward
with the evidence and to establish the main elements of his claim by a preponderance
of proof.
127. The defendant concedes guilt but attempts to avoid punishment on grounds of public
policy. See State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960).
128. An entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates with the officials of the
government" who then induce an innocent person to commit the crime. Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
129. The defendant whose crime results from an entrapment is neither less reprehen-
sible or dangerous nor more reformable or deterrable than other defendants who are
properly convicted. Defendants who are aided, deceived or persuaded by police offi-
cials stand in the same moral position as those who are aided, deceived or persuaded
by other persons.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
130. "Well settled, of course, it is that the doctrine of entrapment does not extend to acts
of inducement on the part of a private citizen who is not an officer of the law." Henderson v.
United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
clusionary rule, which also excludes clearly reliable evidence of
defendant's guilt to deter future constitutional violations by govern-
ment officials.'3 2 By its holding that the defense of entrapment ne-
gates an element of the offense, the Loccisano majority misconceived
the purpose and rationale of the defense.
B. Commonwealth v. Cameron
In Commonwealth v. Cameron, 133 a case decided on facts occur-
ring after the effective date of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,'34 the
superior court followed the Loccisano decision and placed the bur-
den on the Commonwealth to prove absence of an entrapment be-
yond a reasonable doubt.' 35 The Cameron court, however, engaged
in no analysis of its own, but merely cited Loccisano to support its
conclusion. 36 The court apparently assumed that Loccisano over-
ruled that portion of section 313 that unambiguously places the bur-
den of proof upon the defendant to prove the defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Since Loccisano could only overrule
legislative enactments that "clearly, palpably and plainly" violate
the Constitution, 37 the Cameron court's reliance on Loccisano is
misplaced. The reasoning of the Loccisano court, as illustrated
above, cannot meet the standard required to rebut the presumption
of the constitutionality of section 313'38 because the Loccisano court
132. Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, 314, 363 A.2d 1281, 1286 (1976).
133. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 372 A.2d 904 (1977).
134. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code became effective on June 6, 1973. 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101-7505 (Purdon 1973). The alleged offense in the Cameron case occurred in
March, 1975. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 437, 372 A.2d at 905.
135. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 441, 372 A.2d at 907 (1977).
136. 1d at 441, 372 A.2d at 907.
137. Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 464, 391 A.2d 595, 602 (1978). In Daly v. Common-
wealth Horse Racing Comm'n, 38 Pa. Commw. Ct. 77, 391 A.2d 1134 (1978), the court noted
that "all doubts will be resolved in favor of sustaining the legislation." Id at 81, 291 A.2d at
1136.
138. The dissent in Loccisano states that: "Indeed, the error is so obvious that I have
found no other court which has made it." Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. at
540, 366 A.2d at 285 (1976) (Cercone, J., concurring and'dissenting). The majority states that
its result is consistent with the federal courts' view of the burden in entrapment cases. Id at
537, 366 A.2d at 284. While the result is generally in accord with the allotment of the burden
of proof in federal courts, the reasoning is not.
Two well-defined theories of the allotment of the burden of proof are utilized in federal
courts: the bifurcated theory and the unitary theory. Under the bifurcated theory of the bur-
den of proof, entrapment involves two issues. The first issue is whether the defendant was led
or induced into committing the crime by a government agent. The burden of proving this issue
is upon the defendant and he must prove it by a fair preponderance of the evidence. If the
defendant is successful, the burden shifts to the government and the defense will succeed un-
less the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not "other-
wise innocent." United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Gorin
v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963).
In United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1973), a case cited by the Loccissano
majority as being in accord with its result, the circuit court rejected the bifurcated theory in
favor of the unitary theory, which required the government to disprove an entrapment beyond
a reasonable doubt. The court reached this conclusion on the basis that the bifurcated theory
was confusing to the jury. The court also noted that entrapment is a judicially created defense.
Id at 511.
reached its decision based upon an erroneous view of the entrapment
defense. 
39
Moreover, the Loccisano court did not address the constitu-
tional issue of placing the burden of proof upon the defendant. The
court followed the guidance of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Rose. "4o Although Rose held that all elements of the offense must be
proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reached its decision based upon state evi-
dentiary law 4 ' and did not address the constitutional issue
involved.'42 Thus, Loccisano cannot be considered an authority for
judicial repeal of the burden of proof standard provided in subsec-
tion 313(2). The Cameron decision exists without authority for its
placement of the burden of proof upon the Commonwealth against
the clear mandate of section 313(b).
V. Conclusion
The substantial evidence that section 212 is ambiguous pre-
cludes any finding that the General Assembly clearly and unmistak-
ably intended it to overrule prior Pennsylvania entrapment law.
Section 313 should, therefore, be interpreted as a codification of the
entrapment defense as formulated by the superior court in Common-
wealth v. Conway, requiring police conduct likely to entrap the inno-
cently disposed and the actual inducement of an otherwise innocent
defendant.
The burden of proving the defense is upon the defendant. Sec-
tion 313(b) clearly states that the defendant must prove by a prepon-
derance of evidence that his unlawful conduct was in response to an
entrapment. No court has yet held that this allocation of the burden
of proof is inconsistent with constitutional standards.
PAUL F. GEORGE
See also United States v. Greenberg, 444 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court stated
that "the defense of entrapment is primarily the implementation of a policy ... the defense
does not negative any of the essential elements of the crime." ld at 372. See also United
States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. See notes 116-131 and accompanying text supra.
140. Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
141. Id at 389, 321 A.2d at 884.
142. The court stated:
[O]ur decision need not rest on federal constitutional grounds. It is not necessary for
us to speculate that the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
all essential facts encompasses the disproof of other facts (such as intoxication)
which, if found, would establish the existence of an essential fact (such as intent).
Our determination which follows of the issue presented is in terms of state eviden-
tiary law.
Id at 386, 321 A.2d at 882-83. The court refers to the case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. Id at 364.
